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Ken’ichi Matsumoto
 
Speaking to a Chinese diplomat at a symposium on Japan-China rela-
tions about six months ago,I remarked on the fact that 2011was the
 
centennial of the Xinhai Revolution that toppled the Qing dynasty.
“Yes,that’s right,”he replied. “But I don’t suppose that has much to do
 
with Japan.”
Astonished,I spoke of the many Japanese who had cooperated and
 
participated in the revolution,in some cases at the cost of their lives. I
 
mentioned Kita Ikki,who traveled to China and ate,slept,and fought
 
alongside Song Jiaoren,founder of the Kuomintang(Nationalist Party),
as well as such figures as Miyazaki To?ten,Inukai Tsuyoshi,To?yama
 
Mitsuru,the brothers Yamada Yoshimasa and Junzaburo?,and Umeya
 
Sho?kichi. Now it was the diplomat’s turn to be astonished. “I had no
 
idea,”he confessed. Pulling out a memo pad, he asked me to write
 
down the Japanese names I had just mentioned.
It is true that the Chinese Communist Party has tended to downplay
 
the importance of the Xinhai Revolution in its version of Chinese history
 
because many of the revolutionaries went on to become leaders of the
 
Kuomintang. Even so,it was a shock to find such a gap in the knowl-
edge of a Chinese Foreign Ministry official. At the same time,I found
 
myself wondering how many of my own compatriots were aware of this
 
chapter in their history,particularly given modern Japan’s longstanding
 
habit of identifying itself with the West instead of Asia.
I would like to use the centennial of the 1911Revolution as an
 
opportunity to reflect on the historical significance of that event. In
 
doing so,my purpose is not simply to reaffirm Japan’s contribution to
 
the birth of China as a modern state but also to examine the sources of
 
the rising tensions that are currently casting a shadow over the entire
 
region and to seek the key to reversing this trend. For it seems to me
 
that the best way to understand the forces underlying the current
 
conflict and disunity in East Asia is to travel back100years and revisit
 
the period that witnessed the Xinhai Revolution and the birth of the
 Chinese republic.
Yamada Yoshimasa and the Real Pan-Asianism
 
The concept of pan-Asianism was first advanced around the end of the
 
nineteenth century as a means of resisting the Western powers’imperial-
ist expansion in the region. Although the verdict on pan-Asianism is
 
mixed, the prevailing tendency has been to define it simply as the
 
ideological rationalization for Japanese aggression in Asia. In fact,
this is an excessively narrow,one-sided definition grounded in a histori-
cal perspective that views Western civilization as an absolute good.
What sort of thinking actually inspired the aforementioned
 
Japanese activists―pan-Asianists―to support Sun Yat-sen,Father of
 
the Chinese Republic,and devote themselves to the cause of the Chinese
 
revolution?
A good place to begin might be Yamada Yoshimasa,who died in
 
the 1900Huizhou Uprising, a prelude to the 1911 Revolution. The
 
memorial stele dedicated to Yamada,erected in1920at Zensho?an tem-
ple in the Yanaka neighborhood of Tokyo,bears an inscription by Sun
 
Yat-sen himself. Yamada was among the most fervent of Japan’s pan
-Asianists,and a closer look at his life can shed light on this ideology
 
in its earliest and purest form.
Yamada established himself in Tokyo with the help of the political
 
thinker and journalist Kuga Katsunan,who came from the same town.
Heeding the advice of Kuga,who preached the importance of business,
Yamada enrolled in the Imperial Fisheries Institute,where the Christian
 
evangelist Uchimura Kanzo?was teaching,and studied marine products
 
processing. He then took a job at a trading company,which sent him
 
to Shanghai to help sell dried squid to the Chinese.
In China,Yamada was confronted with a country in the process of
 
being picked apart and colonized by the Western powers as the Qing
 
government looked on. Wanting to make a difference somehow, he
 
enrolled at the Institute for Sino-Japanese Commercial Research
(Nisshin Bo?eki Kenkyu?jo).
The Institute for Sino-Japanese Commercial Research was estab-
lished by Arao Sei,a former Army General Staff officer,in cooperation
 
with the entrepreneur Kishida Ginko?,who had been doing business in
 
China since the closing years of the Edo period (1603-1868). Estab-
lished for the ostensible purpose of teaching Chinese to the Japanese,
teaching Japanese to the Chinese,and promoting trade between Japan
 
and China,the institute also gathered intelligence of all sorts concerning
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the people and land of this still largely unknown country. Many of its
 
graduates, Yamada included, went on to serve as army interpreters
 
during the Sino-Japanese War of1894-95.
At the institute Yamada resumed his study of the Chinese language,
and as time passed,he became increasingly convinced of the need for
 
revolution. Like Kishida,Arao,and all the pan-Asianists at the insti-
tute,Yamada believed that Japan could not stand up to the Western
 
powers alone,and that for this reason as well,it was vital that China
 
come to its senses,overthrow the Qing dynasty,and build an indepen-
dent Chinese state.
In 1899,after Yamada had returned to Tokyo,he received a call
 
from Sun Yat-sen,then living in exile. The two hit it off immediately.
The following year,acting on Sun’s behest,Yamada was killed in the
 
abortive Huizhou Uprising.
In his epitaph for the memorial stele at Zensho?an temple, Sun
 
extolled Yamada not simply as a Japanese nationalist or a hero in
 
China’s nationalist revolution but as“a pioneer of the new Asia.” With
 
these words he conveyed Yamada’s understanding of the revolution as
 
something more than the ouster of China’s Qing rulers, as something
 
bigger than China and Japan together―as a joint struggle aimed ulti-
mately at getting Asia back on its feet. Sun’s assessment of Yamada
 
Yoshimasa can be viewed as a distillation of the sentiments embraced
 
by the Japanese pan-Asianists of that time.
From Asianism to Ethnocentrism
 
This early pan-Asianism had an impact on neighboring countries as
 
well. The Asian Peace and Friendship Society(Ashu?Washin Kai)was
 
created in Tokyo in1907. At its meetings,activists from a number of
 
Asian countries that were either actual or potential victims of Western
 
imperialism―including India and Vietnam as well as China and Japan
―gathered in Tokyo and dedicated themselves to Asian independence
 
and solidarity. The Chinese were initially reluctant to allow the
 
Koreans to participate,regarding Korea as a tributary state,but in the
 
end they agreed that unity in the face of the Western imperialist threat
 
should take precedence.
At that time the Chinese and Japanese shared the goal of building
 
a strong,independent Asia. But this early pan-Asianism was replaced
 
by something very different in both Japan and China,and the change
 
engendered any number of internal and external conflicts. Let us begin
 
by looking at China.
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As early as the days of the Xinhai Revolution,the goal of ousting
 
the Manchu Qing dynasty had fostered a somewhat ethnocentric per-
spective―embodied in the slogan“down with the Manchu,up with the
 
Han”―among the Chinese revolutionaries,including Sun Yat-sen him-
self. As a result,the government of the Republic of China that emerged
 
in 1912, ending 2,000 years of imperial rule, was inherently biased
 
toward the Han ethnic group(the Chinese majority). This underlying
 
tendency has not only persisted to the present day but has grown more
 
pronounced over time.
For one brief moment,it seemed as if this Han ethnocentrism were
 
on its way out. Around the time that the People’s Republic of China
 
was founded,in1949,Mao Zedong was advocating the principle of self
-determination put forth by US President Woodrow Wilson after World
 
War I. At that time Mao indicated a willingness to recognize self-rule
 
by the Tibetans,Uighurs,Mongols,and other ethnic minorities within a
 
federal Chinese republic. By1957,however, it became clear that the
 
policy had changed. Zhou Enlai’s emphasis on “regional autonomy”
for ethnic minorities around this time amounted to a declaration that
 
Beijing was unwilling to permit self-rule. In his book Bohyo?naki so?gen
(2009;Plain of Unmarked Graves),Yang Haiying describes how this
 
change in policy ended in the wholesale slaughter of activists accused of
 
belonging to the Inner Mongolia People’s Revolutionary Party,alleged-
ly formed to promote Mongolian separatism.
Today there can be no doubt that the Communist government of
 
China is reaping the whirlwind from the ethnocentrism that first raised
 
its head in the early twentieth century with the birth of the Republic of
 
China. This was vividly demonstrated by the furor that erupted when
 
the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Liu Xiaobo. Liu played a
 
leading role in Charter08,a manifesto calling for democratic reforms,
published on the Internet in December 2008. He is now in prison,
having been tried and convicted of“inciting subversion of state power.”
The Chinese government lashed out against the Nobel committee and
 
put Liu’s wife under house arrest in the wake of the decision to award
 
the dissident the Peace Prize, behavior that earned Beijing a harsh
 
condemnation from the international community.
There is an explanation for the Chinese government’s hypersen-
sitivity on this issue. Charter 08 called not only for Western-style
 
democratic reforms but also for the establishment of a federal Chinese
 
republic. The last thing Beijing will countenance is a revival of the
 
concept of ethnic self-determination and self-rule ultimately rejected by
 
Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong,for the simple reason that it is incompat-
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ible with the Chinese Communist Party’s basic policy of instituting
 
incremental democratic reforms while preserving one-party rule. The
 
reason the Communist government has clung to its hard-line stance in
 
the face of international criticism is that it views minority separatist
 
movements as a serious threat to its existence. Later we will return to
 
this and other social issues facing China today.
From 21 Demands, 100 Years of Resentment
 
How did the situation change in Japan? As explained previously,the
 
Japanese pan-Asianists who devoted themselves to the Chinese revolu-
tion were motivated in large part by a conviction that Japan could not
 
resist the Western powers on its own. But after Japan’s victory in the
 
Russo-Japanese War of1904-5,Japan fell prey to the illusion that it had
 
achieved parity with the Western powers,and its policies toward the
 
rest of East Asia took on an increasingly imperialist character.
In 1915, this undercurrent came to a head in the Twenty-One
 
Demands that Japanese submitted to the fledgling government of China
 
after seizing Qingdao in Shandong Province in the midst of World War
 
I. This list of demands, which claimed major concessions on the
 
Shandong Peninsula, in essence announced the beginning of an era of
 
Japanese expansionist aggression in Asia. Yet the Chinese govern-
ment,led by Yuan Shikai,showed itself all too willing to accept these
 
demands. This triggered a massive and understandable backlash by
 
the Chinese people,and the revolutionaries under Sun Yat-sen demand-
ed that the agreement be revoked.
At this time O¯kuma Shigenobu was prime minister of Japan.
O¯kuma was a typical populist politician who had won the public’s
 
enthusiastic support by trumpeting a hard-line foreign policy stance.
When he died in1922,somewhere between300,000and400,000mourners
 
flooded into Hibiya Park,where his funeral was being held. In con-
trast, the funeral of Meiji Restoration patriot Yamagata Aritomo the
 
same year attracted only 3,000-4,000 mourners. The Twenty-One
 
Demands were put forth by the O¯kuma cabinet,whose power rested on
 
the popular appeal of this kind of demagoguery.
At this stage the imperialist policies of the Japanese government
 
also drew some domestic fire from the pan-Asianist camp. Kita Ikki
 
criticized the government’s approach and wrote that the Twenty-One
 
Demands marked the beginning of a “deeply deplorable”period for
 
Japan. Nakano Seigo? was critical as well. Ishibashi Tanzan, who
 
espoused the British policy of freedom of the seas,argued that Japan
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had“no need of overseas―territory and concessions”and called for a
“Sho?Nippon［small Japan］focused on trade rather than a Dai Nippon
［Great Japan］).”
But these scattered anti-imperialism voices were drowned out.
Making the most of its status as one of the victor nations in World War
 
I,Japan turned ever more decisively toward expansionism.
In1924,en route to Beijing for a summit of the First United Front
 
between the Kuomintang and the CCP,Sun Yat-sen stopped in Kobe,
where he gave a lecture on the topic of pan-Asianism. In his speech he
 
implied that the Twenty-One Demands were no different from the
 
unequal treaties imposed by the West,and that for China to accept them
 
would have been tantamount to accepting Japanese imperial rule.
Then he issued this challenge:“The question remains whether Japan
 
will be a watchdog for the Western Way［rule］of Might or a defender
 
of the Eastern Way［rule］of Right.”
With this observation Sun Yat-sen truly hit the mark. Unfortu-
nately,from this time on,virtually no one in Japan took his challenge to
 
heart or questioned the way Japan had chosen. In the prevailing
 
climate, even the pan-Asianists who had supported and aided the
 
Revolution of1911had become utterly convinced that imperialism was
 
the way forward for Japan.
In fact,the only pan-Asianist who gave Sun Yat-sen’s speech the
 
credit it deserved was Nakano Seigo?. In an essay titled“Son Bun kun
 
no kyorai to Ajia undo?”(Sun Wen and the Pan-Asian Movement),he
 
sharply criticized Inukai Tsuyoshi, To?yama Mitsuru, and other pan-
Asianist forerunners, declaring,“The pan-Asianism of today’s Japan
 
merely answers white imperialism with an imperialism of our own.”
Incidentally,for many years Nakano went unacknowledged as the
 
author of this essay, which he wrote under a pen name. Postwar
 
Japanese scholars considered Nakano too much of a fascist to write
 
such a piece,and their prejudices prevented them from recognizing the
 
truth. For indeed,in his belief that Japan needed to be strong to resist
 
aggression by the Western powers,Nakano was to emerge as one of the
 
most zealous proponents of Japanese militarism and the Pacific War.
Be that as it may, the presentation of the Twenty-One Demands
 
can be considered a historical milepost in the transformation of
 
Japanese pan-Asianism from a belief in Asian solidarity to an imperial-
ist justification for Japanese hegemony. And as such,it may be consid-
ered the ultimate source of the anti-Japanese nationalism that has
 
persisted in China to the present day. Outrage over the “national
 
humiliation”to which the demands subjected China led to anti-Japanese
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demonstrations and escalated into the anti-Japanese May4Movement,
in which the young Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai both rose to promi-
nence.
Another result of the Twenty-One Demands was to strengthen ties
 
between the United States and China as Washington successfully pres-
sured the Japanese government to relinquish its demands for the station-
ing of Japanese military and police forces in China. This ultimately
 
sandwiched Japan between two hostile forces.
Japan had to commit more than one blunder in order to start a
 
reckless war with the United States and breed an anti-Japanese nation-
alism that persists in China to this day. But the Twenty-One Demands,
which single-handedly destroyed the cooperative spirit nurtured in the
 
Xinhai Revolution,must surely go at the top of the list.
The Lost Century
 
The point of“traveling back100years”to understand current problems
 
between Japan and China is to examine how things have changed in the
 
interim. My conclusion,in fact,is that the geopolitical power games in
 
East Asia today are little different from those of100years ago,even
 
though the major players(other than Japan)have changed. History,in
 
other words,is repeating itself.
In1917,just before the end of World War I,the Russian Revolution
 
broke out and the Soviet Union was born. From then until the last
 
decades of the twentieth century,the conflict between communism and
 
its opponents gradually came to dominate international affairs. This
 
was particularly true in the decades following World War II,when the
 
Cold War created a deep and enduring chasm between the Eastern and
 
Western blocs. Throughout that time, a single overriding issue―
whether characterized as the ideological conflict between capitalism
 
and communism or the political rivalry between the United States and
 
the Soviet Union―drove almost all international behavior.
When the collapse of the Berlin Wall ushered in a new era―and a
“third opening”for Japan―this issue ceased to exist. And no sooner
 
had it vanished than the old,pre-Russian Revolution issues reemerged
―namely, nationalistic rivalries centered on religion, ethnicity, terri-
tory,and economic interest. Although the dominant Cold War struc-
ture had overridden and obscured these older rivalries, they had
 
continued to simmer under the surface―on hold,as it were―for close to
 
a century.
In the second half of the nineteenth century,economic development
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and rising nationalism among the Western powers set off a frenzied race
 
to secure new sources of wealth,a race that played out in a series of
 
alliances and bloody wars. By the end of that century,East Asia was
 
the last major region in the world that remained up for grabs. Ignoring
 
Great Britain’s call for peace in the Far East―motivated by a desire to
 
maintain its own supremacy―the other powers rushed in to claim their
 
share:Russia,France,German,and (belatedly)the United States,foll-
owed by an upstart Asian power,Japan.
Japan’s dramatic rise to power posed a threat to the countries of
 
the West. Hoping to nip that threat in the bud,France,Germany,and
 
Russia engineered the so-called Tripartite Intervention, pressuring
 
Japan into renouncing the Liaodong Peninsula,which it had won from
 
China in the First Sino-Japanese War under the terms of the Treaty of
 
Shimonoseki. When Russia took possession of the concessions that
 
Japan had returned to Qing dynasty China (under the Li-Lobanov
 
Treaty),embittered Japanese nationalists began to nurture the dream
 
of one day waging war on Russia―a grim resolve expressed in the
 
phrase gashin sho?tan,or“sleeping on firewood and eating bite.”
What is the situation in East Asia today, a century later? The
 
Western powers no longer threaten the sovereignty of the Asian nations.
But disputes over territory,economic interest,natural resources,and sea
 
lanes have erupted anew. Today the players are China,Japan,South
 
Korea,Vietnam, and Russia. Where previously Great Britain, in an
 
alliance with Japan, monitored the region anxiously in an effort to
 
preserve“peace in the Far East,”the United States now plays much the
 
same role. The basic geopolitical situation, in which powers lock
 
horns in an effort to maximize their own national interests,is the same
 
as it was a century ago.
Today,as the emerging economies of East Asia take up where the
 
Western powers and Japan left off,the most active and energetic player
 
is clearly China. After the death of Yuan Shikai,China was parceled
 
up among the warlords,wracked by civil war,and invaded by Japan.
But it overcame all that, and today,with its economy booming, it is
 
leveraging its new economic clout to maximize its influence and pres-
tige in the global community. Through the successful 2008 Beijing
 
Olympics,it managed to project a sense of unity,national solidarity,and
 
racial harmony to the world.
But the reality inside China is somewhat different. That fragile
 
fabric of national unity is under strain from growing ethnic conflicts
 
and the widening gap between rich and poor. The decision to forcibly
 
unite China as a centralized nation-state instead of a federal republic
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has involved painful and coercive policies,such as the compulsory use
 
of Mandarin Chinese among peoples who historically speak a different
 
language,and such ordeals have only heightened the ethnic conscious-
ness of these minorities. Escalating demands for independence are the
 
inevitable result.
The conventional wisdom is that popular pressure for political
 
freedom and human rights mounts as soon as a nation’s average per
 
capita income passes$10,000. Such was the case in Japan in the1960s
 
and South Korea and Taiwan in the mid-1980s. In places like Shanghai
 
and Guangdong, average income has reached about $9,000. Mencius
 
said that “The people are the most important element in a state;next
 
comes the gods of land and grain; least of all the ruler himself.
Therefore,to win the common people is the way to become emperor.”
Before long,the Chinese Communist Party,in attempting to negotiate
 
the transition to a nation-state,will surely find itself reflecting on the
 
truth of these words. When that time comes, will it be capable of
 
answering the call for democratic reforms and steering a course toward
 
a federal Chinese republic in which minorities have the right of self-
determination? If not,will it ever be able to transcend the“Down with
 
the Manchu,up with the Han”Sino-centrism that has persisted for the
 
past century?
The Voice of Experience
 
For now, in any case,Beijing has clearly chosen to suppress internal
 
differences while striving toward regional hegemony―a choice closely
 
mirroring that of Japan as it turned toward imperialism early in the
 
twentieth century. The result is that much of the world views China
 
with distrust and alarm. If Beijing believes that China can challenge
 
the West’s claim on modern civilization by amassing as much power as
 
possible and throwing its weight around,instead of by offering alterna-
tive values,it is deluding itself.
In an earlier time, rampant ethnocentrism led Japan to commit
 
wrongs of historic proportions. After annexing Korea in 1910,Japan
 
forced the Koreans to adopt the Japanese language and culture. It built
 
an absolutist system in which everything was subordinated to the
 
emperor,and naturally it demanded monolithic,unified loyalty from all
 
its citizens. The absolutism of Japan’s emperor cult and the rise of
 
Japanese imperialism were two sides of the same coin.
Just as Japan sought East Asian hegemony through its imperialist
 
policies,China seems to be seeking the same goal,mainly through the
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buildup of military power. No one knows better than the Japanese
 
what lies at the end of this road. This is precisely why Japan has the
 
ability―and the duty―to point out the perils of China’s present course.
However,we Japanese can only issue such a warning after we have
 
confronted the reasons for our own failure and extrapolated general
 
lessons from that experience. Until we have done that,we can scarcely
 
expect others to heed our advice.
One is reminded again of the choice Sun Yat-sen put to the
 
Japanese people100years ago,between the Way of Might and the Way
 
of Right. How did the Japanese people answer this question? We can
 
scarcely single out the pan-Asianists for turning their back on the
 
Eastern Way of Right. In 1938, Nishida Kitaro?, whom I consider
 
Japan’s only true philosopher, dodged the question this way;“Some
 
speak of a choice between the Way of Right［o?do?］and the Way of
 
Might［hado?］,but for Japan there is only the Imperial Way［ko?do?］.” In
 
other words,in Japan all must yield to the absolute supremacy of the
 
Japanese emperor,descended in one long unbroken line from the gods.
The Japanese have yet to really confront and surmount the issues
 
raised by the emperor system. In 1970, the novelist Mishima Yukio
 
committed ritual suicide with the cry“Tenno?Heika banzai!”(Long live
 
his majesty the Emperor!). Loyalty to the emperor was inseparable
 
from Mishima’s vision of a beautiful, spiritual Japan. The historical
 
novelist Shiba Ryo?taro?objected to this view of Japan,arguing that the
 
essence of the Japanese nation was the spirit of the artisan and the non
-ideological, industrious character of its people. In this debate, two
 
sharply contrasting concepts of Japan collided in a manner that should
 
have been impossible to ignore. And yet we ignored the collision.
It is obvious to anyone reading Sun Yat-sen’s speech that the
 
correct choice is the Eastern Way of Right. But where does it exist
 
today? This question is not addressed only to China. The countries of
 
Southeast Asia are also building up their economic strength at a prodi-
gious pace. Will their new-found power lead to a rising tide of nation-
alism accompanied by hegemonistic, imperialistic tendencies? Once
 
again,if any nation can warn them against such a course,it is Japan,
which erred so badly.
The way to prosperity in East Asia is not ethnocentrism but a quest
 
for solidarity and a search for shared identity,much like that under-
taken a century ago by the Asian Peace and Friendship Society.
The centennial of the Xinhai Revolution offers a rare opportunity
 
for China and Japan to affirm a shared commitment to Asian values.
To begin with,the Japanese government should send representatives to
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attend China’s ceremonies commemorating the Xinhai Revolution at the
 
tomb of Sun Yat-sen. In this way,perhaps both sides can relive that
 
moment in history when a partnership between Japan and China was
 
possible.
＊ Translated from “Sonbun no haka de Ajia to nashonarizumu o furikaero?,”Chu?o?
Ko?ron,February 2011, pp. 150-157.(Courtesy of Chu?o?Ko?ron Shinsha)〔February
2011〕
2012］ 41 Reviving the Spirit of the Xinhai Revolution
